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LOOKING THE GIFT HORSE IN
THE MOUTH: WILD HORSE
MANAGEMENT IN OZARK
NATIONAL SCENIC RIVERWAYS
WILKINS V. LUJAN 1
by Sarah Madden

I

FACTS AND HOLDING

* In Wilkins v. Lujan, Richard Wilkins
and Roland Smotherman sued the Secretary
of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, and the Superintendent of Ozark National Scenic
Riverways, Art Sullivan, in district court to
enjoin the park's planned removal of a pack
of wild horses living in Ozark National Scenic Riverways at that time.2 On appeal,
Lujan sought to lift the district court's permanent injunction. 3
The horses roamed a 24-mile area in the
interior of the 140-mile long park.4 Although
the number of horses had fluctuated marginally over the years, park officials had most
recently estimated the total to be at about
twenty.' Some locals believed that the ancestors of the pack might have first roamed

freely in the park during the 1940's or
1950's.6
Based on various impact studies and
aerial surveys, the park service determined
in 1990 that it should take steps to trap and
remove the horses.' The park superintendent cited the inability of the horses to
overcome environmental factors unique to
the park, ranging from food shortages to
harsh winters, as well as incompatibility with
8
park use as primary to its decision.
Wilkins and Smotherman, joined by other
area residents, filed suit to enjoin the park's
removal of the horses, at which time the
federal district court issued a temporary
restraining order preventing removal. 9 At
the district court trial, Wilkins argued that the
feral horses represented a cultural and historical element of the Ozark Riverways re-

gion and should therefore be allowed to
continue to roam, pursuant to the purposes
articulated in the Ozark Riverways enabling
act.10 The district court stated that the rarelyseen horses were a source of not only local
interest, but an attraction for visitors to the
area.11
The district court found that the Secretary's
plan for removal was subject to review and
reversal under the Administrative Procedure
Act." The court based its holding on two
main issues: first, the Secretary failed to
show that the horses were detrimental to the
use of the park, and second, the Secretary
did not properly assess the horses' value as
3
either a historical or cultural resource.1
Therefore, the court held that removal was
"arbitrary and capricious" and issued a permanent injunction against removal. 14
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, reversed. Held: When the Secretary of the Department of the Interior determines to remove an exotic species from a
park based on a record of conflict with the
resources of the park, it is neither arbitrary
5
nor capricious.1

11. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1964, Congress enacted legislation to
establish Ozark National Scenic Riverways,
16
located in the southem half of Missouri.
The establishment provision stated the mission of the new national park was one of
"conserving and interpreting unique scenic
and other natural values and objects of
historic interest ... management of wildlife,

'995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 921 (1994).
Wilkins v. Lujan. 798 F. Supp. 557, 558 (E.D.Mo. 1992).
3 Wilkins v. Lujan, 995 F.2d 850, 851 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 921 (1994). Ozark National Scenic Riverways encompasses sections of Carter, Dent, Shannon
at 851.
and Texas counties. Included in the park are parts of the Current and Jacks Fork Rivers, as well as Big Springs and Alley Springs. Id.
4 Wilkins, 798 F Supp. at 558.
5 Id.
6Id. at 559-60. The origin of these particular horses was not known; residents dated the horses habitation in the area to at least twenty years before the ban on "open range"
in Missouri in the 1960's. National Park policies identify horses as exotic" species, as scientists estimate that indigenous horses died out as a species in North America around
8000 B.C. Specifically, the National Park Service has defined exotic species as "those that occur in a given place as a result of direct or indirect deliberate or accidental actions
by humans .. lwhich] would not be a natural component of the ecological system characteristic of that place." Id.
Id. at 560.
Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 851. This information was based on impact studies in 1985, 1989. and 1990. The studies noted that the horses ate various types of fauna and crops
growing on rented fields in the area and caused some soil erosion in the park, as well. Id.
9 Id. at 852.
1o Wilkins, 798 F. Supp. at 560.
at 559.
" Id.
12 Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 852 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1966)).
13 Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 852.
14 Id.
2

'1 Id. at 852, 853.
16

16 U.S.C. § 460m (1964)_ The statute specified that the total area of the park in terms of purchased land isnot to exceed sixty-five thousand acres. Id.
M

L

.

25

Vol. 3 * No. 1
and provisions for the use and enjoyment of
the outdoor recreation resources by the
people of the United States." 7
The statute further provided for cooperation between state and federal agencies with
respect to the various preservation and conservation projects which were necessary in
the park.' Aside from Department of the
Interior and National Park Service oversight,
the Ozark National Scenic Riverways Commission, made up of state residents, was to
advise in the park's functioning for its first
ten years of the park's existence."
The American National Park System has
a fairly long tradition. Its earliest origins are
found more than 120 years ago, when
Congress first authorized the creation of
Yellowstone National Park. 20 Congress' most
current articulation of the park system's
purposes describes its functions as "interrelated," incorporating the protection and
management of natural, historical, and recreational areas. 2 1 Statutes require the park
service to accomplish these objectives "in
light of the high public value and integrity of
the National Park System ... except as may

have been or shall be directly and specifically
provided by Congress. "22
In furthering these delineated goals, Congress gave the Park Service considerable
responsibility in the supervision of wildlife in
each national park. Statutes addressing this
area require the Secretary of the Interior to

make necessary and proper general rules
concerning operation of the parks.23 More
specifically, the Secretary may also make the
discretionary decision to remove or destroy
plants or animals that are "detrimental" to
park use.24
Courts have acknowledged that this particular decision-making power is not fettered
with many rigorous guidelines.2s Rather, the
Secretary, via Park Service employees, must
make determinations on a case-by-case basis. 26 One of the few judge-made standards
concerning the park service's wildlife management stated that, in keeping with the
Department of the Interior's already broad
discretion, the Secretary may act preemptively in the destruction of animals which are
expected to damage the parks' native species.2 1
However, courts have also found that the
states in which wild animals are found,
rather than the park systems, are the animals' true "owners." 28 This state ownership
is for the "benefit of the people," and also
carries with it the right to regulate the wild
animals' removal or destruction, apparently
inabsence of National Park System action. 29
There is the potential for significant dispute
in situations where a state policy may be one
of protection, or at least non-interference
with a certain species, in opposition to
actions taken by the National Parks, thus
highlighting an inherent conflict between the

powers of the Secretary and the powers of
the state.
The same regulatory framework under
which most federal agencies operate controls the actions of the National Park System. The Administrative Procedure Act applies to the majority of federal agency actions. The exceptions are those situations in
which Congress has drafted agency-specific
legislation so broadly that "in a given case
there is no law to apply."" Courts have

stressed that the category of unreviewable
cases is quite narrow.31
When an individual brings an action against
an agency, the district court must determine
that an agency's actions are in fact reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act,
based on the existence of applicable and
directive law. 32 The two main indications
that an agency's actions are unreviewable
are where "there isa statutory prohibition on
review or where 'agency action iscommitted
to agency discretion by law.'"
The court will then verify that the plaintiff
has standing.' This issue is also governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act, which
provides that a "person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action .

..

is entitled to

judicial review thereof," in absence of clear
Congressional intent that the agency's actions are not reviewable.3 1
Assuming the plaintiff meets the additional standing elements traditionally re-

Is Id.

16 U.S.C. § 460m-4 (1964).
S16 U.S.C. § 460m-6 (1964).
" 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1970).
21 Id.
2 Id.
- 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
24 Id.
2 See. e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D.Wyo.
1987).
2 See id. at 391.
" New Mexico State Game Comm'n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
2 Id.
29 Id.
- See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 411 (1971) (finding that the decision to route a highway through the park was not -committed
to
agency discretion," but was clearly constrained by applicable legislative guidelines, namely the Department of Transportation Act and the Federal-Aid to Highway Act:
the fact
that the guidelines pertained to the issue indicated that there was law to apply).
31 Id.
'

32

Id.

Wilkins, 798 F. Supp. at 561.
Id.
' Id. Courts have interpreted a "legal wrong" as requiring "some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's allegedly illegal conduct ... fairly traceable to the challenged
action ... likely to obtain redress by a favorable decision." Id. at 560.
3
3

26

MELPR

Looking the Gift Horse in the Mouth
quired, 36 the court will proceed with analyzing the agency's actions further to decide
whether the agency has acted within its
authority.37 The appellate review is de novo,
based on a completely independent review
of the administrative record.3s In doing so,
the court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the agency in question.3 9
A reviewing court must then ascertain
the appropriate standard of review.4 0 The
more common standard requires a court to
set aside agency action that is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. "4 However, in cases where an agency acted pursuant to formal rule-making procedures or
adjudications, the threshold diminishes to
some extent.42 An additional Administrative
Procedure Act clause then requires the action to also be "unsupported by substantial
evidence."4 3 Again, this appears to be a
fairly narrow set of exceptions.
Courts have specifically noted that while
the Secretary of the Interior's discretion is
broad, Congress has often designated a
fairly small range of objectives to be accomplished, like those goals set out in the
National Park Service's enabling legislation."

Courts must normally defer to an agency's
interpretation of any controlling statutes, as
the agency's analysis and resulting actions
carry a presumption of reasonableness which
a challenger must overcome.45
However, courts have noted that this does
not ensure a "rubberstamp" of all agency
acts. 46 The court will assess whether Congress has articulated its intent on the particular issue.4 1 Presumably, this search does not
begin and end with the legislation immediately controlling the agency, but involves a
broader examination. In the event the court
finds the agency's action to be in conflict
with, or perhaps detrimental to Congress'
48
intent, it will hold the action to be invalid.
As they are investigating legislative intent,
reviewing courts look to potentially relevant
statutes beyond the.general management
mandate that at least speak to the issue in
question, if not specifically mandate a particular policy. 4 9 In this regard, one of the
most relevant pieces of legislation concerning the presence of wild animals which are
not indigenous to a given area is the Wild
Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act.5 o
Here, Congress stated its policy to protect
wild horses and burros from capture and

death, as the animals are considered an
"integral part of the natural system of the
public lands.""' The act specifies long-term
ecological supervision aimed at encouraging
both the horses and the surrounding native
52
species to flourish.
However, the act goes on to define "public land" as that which is regulated by the
Bureau of Land Management or the Forest
Service." Although the statute is not binding
on the National Parks, it is this type of judicial
investigation that may reveal pertinent issues on the Congressional agenda that aid
the adjudication process.
After evaluating both explicit and perhaps
even implicit Congressional intent, the reviewing court must examine an agency s
actions in light of its adherence to the
statutes that govern its activities." On a
broader level, the agency must follow the
mandates set out in the Administrative Procedure Act."
As stated previously, the language of the
statutes authorizing wildlife control is liberal
in terms of the amount of decision-making
power the Secretary has. 6 However, when
the Secretary makes the determination that
a particular species of wildlife has become

at 560. The requirements include plaintiffs prove the legal wrong and that their claim iswithin the "zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question." Id.
3 Id at 562.
3 Sierra Club v. Davies, 955 F.2d 1188, 1192 (8th Cir. 1992). The controlling statute is 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977). Citizens to Protect Overton Park. Inc., 410 U.S. at 413.
9 Gettler v. Lyng. 857 F.2d 1195. 1198 (8th Cir. 1988).
1o Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. Inc., 401 U.S. at 414, 415.
" 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
42 Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A.. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 96 S.Ct. 2662 (1976).
43 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). See Gettler 857 F.2d at 1198. The definition of -arbitrary and capricious is clearly defined here as situations in which an agency "relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.- Id.
4 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. Inc., 401 U.S. at 414.
4 Arkansas Poultry Fedn v. U.S.E.P.A.. 852 F.2d 324, 325 (8th Cir. 1988).
4 Id.
41 Sierra Club, 955 F.2d at 1193.
4 Id.
4 Id
- 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1971).
36 Id

5i Id.

5 16 U.S.C. § 1332(f)2) (1971).
5 Id. § 1332(e). While Congressional intent may be to protect wild horses, that zone of protection apparently does not extend to National Parks, like Ozark Riverways, at this
point.
5 Sierra Club. 955 F.2d at 1196.
56 See supra note 25.

I
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detrimental to the use of the park, past
National Park Service policy indicates that
some amount of investigation is necessary
before authorizing destruction or removal.5 7
While Congress has not delineated the
level of thoroughness or a required number
of impact studies, the agency's evaluation is
crucial in the overarching concern of whether
its administrative record will support its
actions."a Courts have found that this record
can even be based on previous, more limited
destruction of the particular animal in furtherance of the park's investigation.59
Courts have specified that the reviewing
court will only take into account the actual
record upon which the agency relied, rather
than one submitted solely for the use of the
district court. 60 In all areas of federal agency
action, courts have consistently held that
they will not accept "post hoc rationalization" as a basis for upholding agency acts.6t
Therefore, courts will pay particular attention to the affidavits the agency in question
submits to determine if the documents are
really reflective of the agency's record in its
entirety.62
In the rather complex preliminary case
analysis, the plaintiff's argument may break
down before the court ever evaluates the
merits of the issue. The court must make a
series of determinations that are potentially
fatal to the case: whether the issue is
reviewable, which may be precluded by

statutory construction or extremely wide
administrative discretion; whether the plaintiff has standing; the appropriate standard
of review; and the authority under which the
agency is required to act, whether it be
independent or guided by legislation.
Given the discretionary nature of the
Secretary of the Interior's role, a successful
challenge to the Secretary's actions is the
rare exception, rather than the rule.63 Nonetheless, such an exceptional challenge came
under scrutiny in the instant decision.

III.

THE INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In overturning the district court's holding
and permanent injunction on removal of the
horses, the Court of Appeals first determined that the National Park Service acted
in its decision-making capacity, rather than
its more official functions of rule-making and
adjudication, which would indicate review
might be unavailable." Thus, the Court
agreed with the court below that the proper
standard of review required a reversal of
agency policies only if they were "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 6
In keeping with that standard, the Court
stated that deference must be given to an
agency's reading of its own controlling statutes.66 In addition to an acceptance of any
"reasonable" legislative interpretation, the

Court found that it must also defer to the
agency's development and enforcement of
the policies it sets forth to meet its Congressional mandates.67
The Court further stated that as this was
an agency action review, it must base its
judicial findings on an independent, or de
novo review of the same record originally
examined by the district court.68 In making
this independent review, the Court then
focused on the administrative record which
detailed the National Park Service's plan to
remove the wild horses.
Noting that some individuals consider
horses to be an exotic species, the Court
went on to describe the various types of
damage the park attributed to the animals.6 1
In particular, itmentioned crop damage and
soil erosion, as well as the threat to plants
and animals defined as indigenous to Ozark
National Scenic Riverways. 0 Finally, the
Court found that the horses created a danger
for park users, in that the park had received
reports of several people shooting at and
harassing the horses.n
Based on these factors, the Court found
that the horses were "in conflict with the
purpose of the park, which is to maintain,
rehabilitate, and perpetuate the park's natural resources ...."7 The Court stated that not
only did the enabling legislation of the National Park Service allow for destruction of
animals that were detrimental to park use,

" Wilkins, 798 F. Supp. at 562. See Citizens to PreserveOverton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416 (the reviewing court must determine if the agency based
its conclusions on relevant
fact, a process that typically requires the agency to educate itself as to possible solutions available; although the agency need not produce a formal finding
of fact, the Secretary
must reasonably believe "there are no feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve unique problems").
* Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 853.
" New Mexico State Game Comm'n, 410 F.2d at 1201.
* Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
6 Amercan Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981) (citing
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. Inc., 401 U.S. at 419).
62 Id.
I This may lead to consistent results, in that National Park Service actions will almost invariably survive the court's scrutiny, but no easy
answers will be found to the legal and
ecological questions that will continue to confront the National Parks, the people who use them, and the courts.
4 Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 853. See also supra text accompanying note 32 (stating that
the reviewability of these functions is primarily a function of legislative intent).
6 Id. at 853.
1 Id. at 853 (citing Arkansas Poultry Federation, 852 F.2d at 325).
6
Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 853.
6

69

Id
Id.

" Id. at 852. The Court's finding of fact stated that "reports include the shooting of a mare for her colt. the death of a stallion resisting capture,
and the shooting of a horse purportedly
to attract coyotes." Id.
n Id. at 853.
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the Secretary could take early preventative
measures to curtail any substantial damage.7 3
In conclusion, the Court held that while
the court below was correct in using the
'arbitrary and capricious" standard, it erred
in its application. 74 More specifically, the
Court criticized the district court for engaging in independent fact finding 7 5 In light of
administrative record, the Court found that
the agency's plan to remove the horses was
justified.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Like the majority, the dissenting opinion
found that the appropriate review for informal agency acts was the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. 6 It stressed that the
existence of a "decision document," explaining the agency's reasoning at the time
of its actions, was crucial to the defense of
those actions.7 7 The dissent stated that while
there was, in fact, a document the Park
Service identified as its decision document,
the Park Service had made its actual decision some time before it communicated this
intention to the public.7 8
The dissent found this time-lag to be
significant. It suggested that the rationale the
agency had articulated in its decision docu-

ment did not correspond with what agency
officials later testified was their intent during
the planning stages, indicating a "post hoc
rationalization." 79
In addition, the dissent found that there
were further grounds for the argument that
the agency's original justification was not
what it testified to in court, the dissent cited
statements from park officials who indicated
that at some point before they officially
announced the planned roundup, they believed National Park System regulations actually required removal.8 0 Stating that "an
agency cannot defend its actions on grounds
different from those on which the action
were based," the dissent argued that these
two discrepancies made the agency's actions invalid.81
The dissent went on to observe that even
had the majority been correct in accepting
the Secretary's reasoning as contemporaneous with the horse removal plan, that reasoning fell short in other areas." The dissent
cited the National Park Service's "Management of Exotic Species Already Present"
plan, which says that while exotic species
may be destroyed when necessary, their
management is afforded a "high priority" in
park planning, requiring programs based on
'"scientific information that ... demonstrates

their impact on park resources.'"
The dissent pointed to several specific
areas where it found the agency acted upon
assumptions, rather than objective data. As
a starting point, the dissent said the horses
were in good health, by Ozark National
Scenic Riverways' own admission, despite
the fact that the Park Service portrayed the
horses as suffering from lack of food and the
unfavorable climate." It also stated that
while the horses may cause future problems
in the park environment, which may be
acted upon before the fact, studies predicting future impacts were as inconclusive in
assessment of damage as present evaluations were. 5
In conclusion, the dissent said that one of
the most important factors both the Secretary and the majority had failed to take into
account was the importance of the horses as
a cultural resource.8 ' The dissent stated that
several sources indicated Congressional interest in the protection of wild horses and in
cultural resources in general." It said that
while a reviewing court must give an agency's
decision the deference it demands, the particular facts of this case called for at least a
temporary injunction against the Park
Service's wild horse removal plan, as it was
88
both arbitrary and capricious.

Id. (citing New Mexico State Game Commission, 410 F.2d at 1199).
* Wilkins. 995 F.2d at 852, 853.
Id. The instant decision stated, "the district court in the present case chose not to remand the matter to the Secretary, and instead developed independent findings of fact at
trial." Id
76 Id. at 854.
n Id. See Vennont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.. 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) (the dissent in Wilkins is apparently equating "decision
document" with what Vermont calls a -contemporaneous explanation of the agency decision").
7
Wilkins. 995 F.2d at 854. The dissent pointed to a press release of May, 1990, that announced the plan to roundup the horses, accompanied by several arguments for their
removal which were not supported by data. This release was followed by a letter in February 1991, which the Acting Assistant Secretary identified as the decision document.
Unlike the press release, the letter detailed the results of various studies. Thus, the dissent argued that neither rationalization was contemporaneous with the actual decision, which
the dissent suggested may have been as early as 1985. Id
71 Id. at 855.
1 Id The relevant testimony, in part, from Superintendent Sullivan is as follows:
-Q. Had there been a decision made prior to the [1985] study to remove the horses?
A. . . . I don't think there was ever any question about the decision being made, I think the decision was made for us ... under our rules and regulations and under the laws
and policies. The management had no leeway .... I think the decision isbuilt into the management policies of the National Park System and those in tum emanate from certain
pieces of legislation.- Id at 854.
Id. at 855 (citing General Dec. Co. v Nuclear Regulatory Comm n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1403-04 (7th Cir. 1984)).
82 Wilkins. 995 F.2d at 855.
8 Id.
* Id. at 855-56.
Id. at 856. A 1985 study of the horses' impact at that time found little damage and stated -extensive investigation would take considerable time and money which may not
be necessary.- The 1991 future impact study summed up its findings by saying. i[plermitting the horses to stay would require [the Park Service] to document and mitigate impact
on listed species and habits in the area.- Id.
8 Id.
" Id The dissent cited 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act) as well as 16 U.S.C. § 460m (the enabling legislation for the Ozark National Scenic
Riverways). Id.
a Id.
71

a

a

a
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IV. COMMENT
To interpret the significance of Wilkins,
both to Ozark National Scenic Riverways
and for its broader impact on National Park
policy, it is helpful to first analyze the instant
decision in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of its holding, as well as the assumptions and policies which the Court emphasized in that holding. Both the majority and
the dissent based their respective holdings
primarily on two sources: National Park
Service guidelines, and the evidence before
the Court. The Court's review was appropriately confined to these matters, in accordance with the narrowly defined role courts
play in administrative review.89
Arguably, the Court's holding was correct, in that the park followed Department of
the Interior guidelines when it determined it
necessary to remove the feral horses. This
type of decision can only be seen as a
discretionary one, in terms of the latitude
given to the National Park Service to best
fulfill the national park "ideal," as well as the
extremely diverse number of situations the
Park Service will face.
In any given act of policy-making, the
individual park must interpret statutory mandates, often based not on the controlling
statutes themselves, but on previous interpretations from the National Park Service.
The definitions of terms and policies are part
of the rather amorphous body of park guidelines upon which the Court based its verification of Ozark National Scenic Riverways'
own interpretation and subsequent actions.
The Court's analysis turned on several
key definitions used by the park, one of the
most important being "exotic species." On
this point, the park clearly focused on the
length of time these particular horses were
thought to have roamed in what is now the
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park, as well as the fact that scientists believe
horses were not reintroduced to North
America until the 1500's.90
Ozark National Scenic Riverways also
had to define what scope the term "detrimental" encompassed. Park officials referred
collaterally to park users and those farmers
renting cropland within the grounds, but
seemed to rely most upon the threat they
perceived to the native species in the area.9'
Although scarcely articulated, perhaps
the most important definition was a selfdefinition of the park's actual purpose. The
enabling legislation for the National Park
Service as a whole, and Ozark National
Scenic Riverways as a distinct unit, echoes
the same themes: the dual purposes of
protection and management of wildlife, and
the availability of historical, cultural, and
recreational resources.92 In light of the testimony given at trial, the park stressed the
former almost exclusively, and effectively
ignored the latter.93
The Court of Appeals also looked for
evidence in the agency's record to support
the National Park Service's actions. The
evidence seems to have gone mostly toward
the issue of detriment. The Court was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence of
detriment within the record, in the form of
harassment and poor health of the horses,
past park destruction attributed to the horses,
and the likelihood and magnitude of future

damage. 94
It is difficult to ascertain from the opinion
alone the extent and quality of data the Park
Service put forth on each of these claims. In
the end, the Court seemed to emphasize that
since this is ultimately a discretionary decision, any amount of supporting evidence is
enough to overcome the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.9

The dissent in the instant decision highlighted the possibility of procedural flaws in
the National Park Service's removal planning that may have invalidated the actions,
making further discussion moot.9 6 However,
beyond these criticisms lies a set of counterarguments that mirror those made by the
majority, also focusing on the guidelines
Ozark National Scenic Riverways purported
to follow and the evidence it used to support
its actions.
Itcan be contended that while the park did
follow the letter of National Park Service
guidelines, it neglected to follow their spirit.
Above all, the legislation concerning the
origins of the National Park Service calls for
the agency to strike a "balance between
preservation and promotion."97
The same key terms relied upon by the
park in its horse removal planning and by the
majority in support of the plan appear to
have alternative definitions that Ozark National Scenic Riverways could have applied,
bearing in mind the discretion Congress has
authorized. As indicated by the dissent,
perhaps a re-evaluation of these terms was
in order, given the fact that no broad mandate will ever take into account the unique
facets of each particular park. Further, careful examination of the definitions espoused
by the Park Service might have avoided what
the dissent pointed to in terms of the park
acting on assumptions, rather than actual
98
park guidelines.
As a starting point, it would have been
difficult for the Court to construe "exotic" in
any way other than the manner it chose,
given the particular definition provided. 99
However, the belief of some scientists that
horses originated as a species in North
America,'" coupled with the fact that the
horses, regardless of their precise date of

See supra note 43.
* Supra note 6.

Wilkins, 798 F. Supp. at 562.
* 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1970), and 16 U.S.C. § 460m (1964).

9

a

See supra note 80.

'4

Wilkins, 955 F.2d at 852-53.

95 Id. at 853.
* See supra note 78.

* National Wildlife Fedn, 669 F. Supp. at 390.
98 See supra text accompanying note 80.
* See supra text accompanying note 90.
10 Kyla Seligsohn-Bennett, Mismanaging Endangered and "Fxotic- Species in the National Parks. 20 E-vna L. 415. 428 (1990).
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origin in any respect, predate the establishment of the park, could at least create some
question as to what "exotic" really means. 0 1
Even more at issue might be the way in
which the park chose to define "detrimental." There is some validity in the lower
court's and dissent's opinions that the administrative record simply did not demonstrate the amount of damage necessary to
remove all of the horses, if ecological damage was in fact the National Park Service's
main concern.' 0 2
Again, the over-arching question presented might be better termed as the role
Ozark National Scenic Rivenways has defined for itself within the context of the
National Parks System. o Seeking to achieve
a balance of its dual purposes would not
have to signal less emphasis on preservation, but rather a heightened awareness of
the cultural, scenic, and historical functions
that necessarily accompany the mission of
all national parks.
The dissent observed that the same evidence upon which Ozark National Scenic
Riverways focused in its planning may have
indicated both past and future problems, but
was inconclusive beyond those speculations.'" Even under the highly deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard, an agency
decision cannot stand if it is based on "...an

explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency."oS
It is important to note that confined to its
facts, the Wilkins decision may ultimately be

correct: The wild horses, in reality, may be
a significant detriment to the park, in which
case the National Park Service unquestionably has the authority to act as the circumstances dictate. However, in such a highly
discretionary decision, common sense and
the park system itself demand that any new
management plan must be one based on
solid scientific data and reasonable alternatives.'0
Perhaps one of the most serious flaws in
current park management is the very issue
that is central to Wilkins: individual parks are
given too much discretion and not enough
guidance for effective management planning. Loosely defined terms contribute to
this problem. Words like "exotic" are akin to
terms of art when interpreted and reinterpreted through the various layers of park
management. These difficulties are compounded when parks perceive a rigid mandate in what the park system considers only
a discretionary policy. 07 Even the concept
of a park "use" is subject to alternative
readings that potentially have quite different
impacts. 08
Further, critics fault the National Park
Service for requiring especially detailed wildlife management plans, or "Environmental
Impact Statements" only under certain circumstances. " These same critics are often
frustrated by their perception that the parks
discount public input. 0 The extent of public
comment that the parks currently encourage
would be cut short dramatically, with poten-

tially significant effects on wildlife, by proposed measures that would prevent the
parks from having to disclose some types of
wildlife management to the public."'
Itis difficult to argue with the principle that
exotic animals and plants, if unchecked, can
create havoc in a delicately balanced ecosystem." 2 The resulting harm may not be
limited to competing species, as in situations
where overpopulation of an exotic species
may lead to eventual death of the exotic
species, as well as other wildlife."'
A more difficult question presents itself
when even scientists are unable to agree on
whether a particular species is exotic." 4
park may fail to evaluate the significance of
past - even the distant past - species habita-

tion in the area."' Although a species may
not have originated in a region, long-term
exotic "guests" may predate other species in
the park."' More importantly, park management may not analyze the fact that semipermanent exotic species may have been
evolving and interacting with native plants
and animals for an 6xtended period."'
Further problems arise due to the limited
degree of National Park Service oversight.
Bureaucracies, by their very nature, are
difficult to regulate."" Critics have stated
that the National Park Service legislation is
so ambiguous that for all practical purposes,
a reviewing court will be unable to find an
abuse of discretion in the park actions in
question." 9 Much of the blame can be
placed on Congress, which may draft legis-

" Wilkins, 798 F.Supp. at 564.
Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 856; Wilkins, 798 F. Supp. at 563. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
103 Supra text accompanying note 92.
a Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 856.
'0

5o Supra note 43.
'" See Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 855 (citing the Park Service Policy titled "Management of Exotic Species Already Present," which states in part, "the decision to initiate a management

program will be based on existing, and where necessary newly acquired, scientific information that identifies the exotic status of the species, demonstrates its impact on park
resources, and indicates alternative management methods and their probabilities of success"). Id.
10' See supra note 80.
"1 See William Andrew Shutkin. The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA. ENvT.. L.J. 345 (1991) (discussing possible interpretations of "use": "in the context of progressive
conservation, use denotes a utilitarian or consumptive relationship to nature .... Use in the preservationist sense means an aesthetic, spiritual or recreational relationship to
nature . . . ."). Id. at n.16.
50 See Seligsohn-Bennett. supra note 100, at 428, 429 (stating that the National Park policies did not require the Assateague National Park Service to submit
an Environmental
Impact Statement, as it considered the feral ponies in the park to be exotic). ButseeCarmi Weingrod, On the Horns ofa DilemmaNAnoNAL PARKS,
May/June 1994, at 30 (describing
how Olympic National Park determined it necessary to proceed with an Environmental Impact Statement for management planning of exotic wild goats).
no See Weingrod, supra note 109, at 30.
Seligsohn-Bennett. supra note 100, at 439.
"i John L. Dentler, Comment, Noahs Farce: The Regulation and Control of Exotic Fish and Wildlife, 17 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 191, 198 (1993).
1' Kenneth P. Pitt. The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act: A Western Melodrama,
15 ENvT.L 503, 507 (1985). This article describes a protected population of deer
in Arizona, which, in the absence of predators, grew from 4,000 to 100,000 in less than 20 years; the population eventually stabilized, but not before 80,000 deer starved to
death. Id. at 516 n.72.
114 Weingrod, supra note 109. at
31.
115Id at 31. There is some debate as to whether the mountain goats found at Olympic National Park originally inhabited the region; some scientists suggest this may have been
possible millions of years ago. Id. at 31-32.
"6

Id

"' Seligsohn-Bennett supra note 100, at 430.

u See. e.g.. Weingrod, supra note 109, at 30 (describing the formation of the -Interagency Goat Management Team," made up of Olympic National Park, Olympic National
Forest. and Washington Department of Wildlife, all of whom had an interest in the wild goats). Id.
"' Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development in the National Parks. 11 STAN. ENvn. L.J. 3 (1992).
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lation defined by an "absence of structure,"l 2 0 that contributes little to the problems existing, or perhaps even created by
the legislation. 21 To begin to fashion a
workable solution to the wildlife management dilemma, the courts should encourage
a more rationally-based decision-making
process, even within the confines of their
fairly narrow scope of review. By accepting
only clearly articulated, scientifically supported reasoning, the courts ensure discretionary decisions are justified.
Congress can also help to clear up some
of the uncertainties parks face by more
clearly defining the dual purposes of the
National Park system,' 22 as well as being
more willing to assert its intent to help guide
the various management plans for which
parks are responsible.
Correspondence between a United States
Representative from Missouri and the Superintendent of Ozark National Scenic
Riverways indicated that park management
continued to believe that the only way it
could be prevented from removing the wild
horses at this point is through an amendment of the act that gave life to the park.123
Consequently, Representative Bill Emerson,
R-Mo., recently introduced the "Ozark Wild
Horses Protection Act," which prohibits
Department of Interior interference with the
horses excepting cases of natural or medical
emergency. 124
Critics might justifiably argue that this
type of intervention by lay persons, i.e. those
outside of the scientific community, could
yield disastrous results. While the appropriate amount of Congressional intervention is
certainly debatable, this particular conflict is
representative of the struggle parks have
encountered in shaping their own identity in

the face of an omnipresent responsibility to
meet the needs of the public.
The Department of the Interior must
strive to more clearly articulate its own
"house" rules. The most important, albeit
not exclusive overall mission of the park
system is arguably preservation.'
However, the National Park Service must draw
the line between "mandates" and "suggestions" more cleanly, as is evident in the

Wilkins case.12 6
By requiring a more stringent reasoning
process on which to base wildlife management plans, individual parks can better satisfy the public, the courts, and themselves
that an act as drastic as complete elimination
of an exotic species from a park is wellfounded.' 27 The combined effect of workable, standard definitions and a greater emphasis on data collection would also improve
decision making.
Admittedly, the former goal is somewhat
ambitious, given that scientific thinking is
continuously evolving. The second goal necessarily equates added expense, but the
information to be gained is crucial. Park
officials should have a very clear understanding of the impact of exotic species,12 as well
as the various reasonable alternatives that
exist. Since the Wilkins ruling, Ozark National Scenic Rivenvays has indicated that a
possible intermediary solution might be relocating the horses to a wild horse preserve in
the area. " While this might not be the
resolution opponents to the removal had
wanted, it is at least an acknowledgement of
the public's demand for "local autonomy" in
the control of the park that can be observed
in Wilkins. 1
All parties concemed can benefit from the
realization that wildlife, whether exotic or

not, is a resource. Sights like the wild goats
of Olympic National Park perched on rocky
crevices or feral horses racing across an
open field are unforgettable and add to the
recreational experience of park-goers.13 1 Our
nation's culture and history can be represented by wild ponies in western states that
come from the same genetic stock as the
horses left by Spanish explorers of the
sixteenth century,132 or even the more
common horses of Ozark National Scenic
Riverways that several generations of visitors have traveled to see.'"
Even exotic animals may be considered
an ecological resource. Beyond the effect a
long-term exotic animal may have on its
ecosystem, some scientists argue that these
uniquely evolved animals carry a wealth of
genetic information that must be preserved,
as with any other protected species.13"
Perhaps the most promising solution to
the concerns of preservationists, park management, and the public is represented by
the "multiple use-sustained yield" concept.
Not a diminishment of the precedence preservation takes in National Parks, this theory
is an effort to encourage management decisions based on the total ecological picture
before officials articulate specific priorities.'In the meantime, courts will struggle to
define concepts like "native" species and
proper park "uses." The burden of the
ambiguity that is so prevalent in the very
mission of the park system will continue to
fall on the courts, which have a most difficult
task in setting a standard for the seemingly
subjective decision of when a species becomes "detrimental" to park use, and to
whom it must be detrimental in order to
justify agency action.
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